Restoring Harmony through Nalyeeh: Can the
Navajo Common Law of Torts be Applied in State
and Federal Forums?
J.R. Mueller1

INTRODUCTION

Tribal courts are faced with the task of restoring harmony to their
communities and crafting practical remedies acceptable to the people can be
challenging.2 Many tribal courts in the United States are struggling to incorporate
traditional tribal customary law into modern judge-decided law. The Navajo Nation
has been especially proactive in this endeavor. Berkeley law professor Robert D.
Cooter and Professor Wolfgang Fikenstscher of the University of Munich observe:
The Navajos, who have the largest, most populous, and one of
the richest reservations in America, also have the best funded
tribal court system. The Navajo Supreme Court hears many
cases each year argued by lawyers who continually refer back
to its past decisions, which are published and stored in an
impressive library. The Navajo judges speak about “Navajo
common law” and regard themselves as participating in its
elaboration and development.3
The Navajo Nation touches four states, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico,
and Utah and its population nears one quarter million tribal members.4 In size, the
Navajo Nation occupies the largest Indian reservation in North America. Because
of the Navajo Nation’s vast size and large population, the probabilities that a nonNavajo lawyer might require some understanding of its legal complexities seem
quite likely. For this reason, among others, the Navajo Nation’s traditional law and
its judicial system have been chosen for investigation in this paper.
In the traditional Navajo experience, the meaning of life is to maintain
balance between the individual and the universe. This means to organize one’s life
so that one can live in harmony with the natural world.5 As traditional Navajo Betty
Tso writes, “We the five-fingered beings are related to the four-legged, the winged
beings, the spiritual beings, Father Sky, Mother Earth, and nature. We are all
relatives. We cannot leave our relatives behind.”6 This paper will demonstrate that
the Navajo Nation has developed and articulated a modern tort law and doctrine of
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restitution grounded in Navajo tradition and evolved from ancient custom, similar
to the Anglo-American notion of common law. This Navajo doctrine of law has
been applied most recently against a state supported workers’ compensation
scheme.
This paper will also discuss the definition and sources of Navajo
customary law. Further, the paper will examine several Navajo Nation court
decisions that can be used to tease out a tort doctrine. The paper will also look
toward the Navajo Tribal Code in an effort to demonstrate how the Tribal Council
has codified customary doctrines, such as, restitution. Moreover, the paper will also
look at the statements of Navajo judges who in their own words explain how the
Navajo common law developed into the modern body of law found today. Finally,
the paper will discuss a recent federal case Cheromiah v. United States7 where a
federal court held that tribal customary law would control in a tort action against
the federal government.8
I. Navajo Traditional Law as Restorative Justice
One definition of “law” is that it is composed of three things: norms,
institutions and force. A “norm” is a feeling of “ought.” One “ought” to do this and
ought not do that. A norm becomes a law when it is enforced by an “institution”
such as a court or the police. Many definitions insist that without force, or without
ability to punish, there can be no “law”. The Anglo definition of “law” insists on
visible institutions such as courts and punishment. This type of “law” can only
hurt; it cannot heal.9
For Navajo people, the dynamics of justice has much more to do with the
importance of relationships. Navajo justice concerns itself with harmony and
restoring good relations. Thus, unlike its Anglo counterpart, Navajo law seeks to
heal.10 Central in the Navajo idea of law is the notion of hozho or harmony11—
harmony not in the sense of its usual English usage, but something more profound.
An English speaker might think of harmony as an internal calmness, or perhaps a
sense of tranquility. Others might define harmony as something in the context of an
integration of separate parts, or an agreement. 12 Yet, when Navajos speak of
harmony their definition is closer to a quality or sense of natural and spiritual
perfection. 13 In other words, Navajo traditional law seeks to find a place for
everything and put everything in its place. James Zion, former solicitor to the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court, relates, “[t]he legal systems of Indian peoples were
based upon the idea of maintaining harmony in the family, the camp, and the
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community.”14 Today, the Navajo Nation judiciary has been charged with the task
of ensuring social harmony and has chosen to revive traditional law as means of
realizing what in Navajo is called hozho hahasdlii “now that we have done these
things we are again in good relations.”15 Well beyond the sphere of jurisprudence
in its application, Navajo traditional law serves as a process designed to lead to
“healing of the body, the mind, and the spirit.”16
A. Navajo Traditional Law and the Judiciary
The use of custom in tribal jurisprudence, codified and common law, with
the appropriate Anglo-American law concepts produces synergistic results, rather
than a laminate with discrete layers. While elegant integration of diverse legal
concepts is an accomplishment in itself, that is not the primary benefit of tribal law.
Of most value is the creative capacity of tribal courts, shown through the work of
[American Indians trained in law who also retain their cultural identity and
sensitivities] [and] use the old to make new and appropriate law… In both the tribal
law and the concept of [American Indians trained in law who also retain their
cultural identity and sensitivities], there is an innovative result that is consistent
with a pervasive characteristic of the indigenous nations: the capacity to change as
an evolving culture.17
Professor Valencia-Weber points out that tribal court systems have been
the driving engine of internal legal innovation. In the case of the Navajo people,
adaptation and creative modernization have been a mainstay of the culture since
first contact with Europeans.18 The incorporation of cattle and horses into the
culture are two such examples. Similar to the horse, perhaps even more important,
was the adoption of sheep herding which eventually figured central in Navajo
agrarian culture both in terms of economics and religion. 19 Like agricultural
techniques, the Navajo people have adopted components from various political
systems in an effort to synthesize a genuine Navajo legal structure. When cultures
such as the Navajo, embrace conceptualizations from another “donor” society, the
original meanings are lost and become part of the adoptees’ identity.20
Since 1981, the Navajo Nation judiciary has sought to systematically
incorporate Navajo traditional law into the law books.21 The first major revival of
Navajo traditional law was the re-creation of an ancient dispute resolution process
in modern guise, the Peacemaker Court. This structure brought together traditional
dispute resolution, a talking out process, and the authority of a district court
order.22 Justice Yazzie explains, “alien ways do not solve peoples’ problems…
14
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Rather, if the Navajo courts institutionalize Navajo justice concepts—equality,
talking things out and consent—that will respond to expectations that Navajo
people already have.”23 Many observers point to the success of the Peacemaker
Court where there is less than a five percent rate of recidivism for criminal and
quasi-criminal cases resolved through the system.24 Clearly, this low rate points to
the program’s popular support and its legitimization in the eyes of the people.25
Desiring to enhance the prestige and usage of traditional law, Navajo
statutory law provides for the introduction of custom.26 Experts do not always
prove custom in court. Where most tribal members commonly know a custom, it is
proven.27 The Navajo Nation Supreme Court explained in Dawes v. Yazzie,28 that
there are several options when relying upon Navajo common law.29 Parties may
introduce expert witness testimony, or the judge may take judicial notice of Navajo
common law, or common law may be supported/proven through scholarly
works.30 Justice Raymond Austin explains why the Navajo Nation judiciary has
been so dynamic in applying traditional law:
We prefer Navajo common law for several reasons. First, it is what our
constituents know and want. Second, it gives us control over our own law without
outside interference and second-guessing. Third, we believe that our concepts of
freedom, liberty, equality and fairness are superior to Anglo-American principles.
Finally, we want Navajo law, which is framed by Navajos, written by Navajos, and
used by Navajos. It is our law, and we are free to develop it to meet the changing
needs of Navajo Society as it proceeds in an alliance with the United States, which
began in 1868.31
Since the 1980’s the Navajo judiciary has been very proactive in
incorporating custom into Anglo style judge-made law. Traditional Navajo ideas of
restitution and injury, or what non-Navajos might call tort law, will be examined
below.
B. Traditional Navajo Tort Law
What happens when there is a dispute? The person who claims the injury
demands nalyeeh. The word is translated as “restitution” or “reparation,” but it is
an action word, which demands compensation for an injury and an adjustment of
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relationships between an “offender” and a “victim.” Who is the judge? It is not
a naat’aanii, but the persons who are involved in the dispute.32
Historically, Navajos have sought to settle disputes by talking things
out.33 When someone harmed another, the party causing the injury compensated the
victim or victim’s family. 34 The compensation was thought to be a symbolic
gesture that would actually restore the community to a sense of harmony or
wholeness.35 In earlier times prior to the reservation era, Navajos would shun an
offender and demand restitution for the harm caused to the victim and his/her
relations. Restitution remedied bad feelings and restored good will.36
[T]raditional Navajo tort law is based on nalyeeh, which is a demand by a
victim to be made whole for an injury. In the law of nalyeeh, one who is hurt is not
concerned with intent, causation, fault, or negligence. If I am hurt, all I know is that
I hurt; that makes me feel bad and makes those around me feel bad too. I want the
hurt to stop, and I want others to acknowledge that I am in pain. The maxim
for nalyeeh is that there must be compensation so there will be no hard feelings.
This is restorative justice. Returning people to good relations with each other in a
community is an important focus. Before good relations can be restored, the
community must arrive at a consensus about the problem.37
Even a quick reading of Justice Yazzie’s words reveal that tort law in the
Navajo Nation is quite different from its Anglo-American counterpart. The
foundation on which Navajo tort law rests is the idea of harmony—a radical
departure from the adversarial fault based nature of American tort law.38 Central to
Navajo tort law is the flexible concept of restorative justice called nalyeeh.39 In the
past, nalyeeh was a symbolic payment of material goods e.g. sheep, horses, silver,
given in an effort to restore an injured party to wholeness.40 Over time, modern
Navajo courts have acknowledged nalyeeh as something more analogous to the
western idea of monetary damages.41 What is important to grasp is the reality of the
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doctrine’s wide-ranging applicability and elasticity. So broad and encompassing is
the doctrine’s restorative force that the Window Rock district court in Benally v.
Navajo Nation42 recognized, “[n]alyeeh, traditionally, has the power to correct
wrongs of any kind.”43 The court, guided by Bryant v. Bryant,44 linked the concept
of nalyeeh to Anglo style cash awards.45 The Shiprock District Court explained that
the jury in Benally, had no problem awarding monetary damages “[t]here was no
talk of sheep or horses in that opinion… Navajos today look to their codes and
tribal law to seek fair compensation.”46
The Navajo courts have also applied nalyeeh in automobile personal
injury cases. In Cadman v. Hubbard,47 the Crownpoint District Court recognized
that 7 N.T.C. Section 701(d) which authorizes damages for injuries, was akin to a
pure comparative fault scheme similar to that found in both New Mexico and
Arizona. Moreover, the court likened the statute to essentially a codification
of nalyeeh.48 The court pointed out that anything short of a pure comparative fault
system simply did not offer victims adequate opportunity for
compensation.49 Citing to the Benally case, the court explained that compensating
victims was “the Navajo way”.50
Navajo law also recognizes a tort action for recovery of damages resulting
from spousal assault and rape. In Kuwanhyoima v. Kuwanhyoima 51 Judge
Bluehorse instructed that Navajo notions of harmony or hozoprohibited the use of
unreasonable force by a husband towards his wife. Further, the court recognized
that crimes such as spousal rape were forbidden under Navajo common law. The
court also broadened the nalyeeh doctrine by stating that in some instances
compensation payments can be spread out and paid to the family or clan members
of the injured.52
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court has also applied nalyeeh to insurance
proceeds. In Benalli v. First National Insurance Co. of America,53 the Navajo high
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style damages. Id.
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court likened an insurance board to a Navajo clan.54 The employee plaintiff was
similarly compared to a Navajo relative like a cousin. The restorative power
of nalyeeh, which restores the plaintiff to wholeness, was held to be based upon
two factors, the injury; and the relatives’ ability to restore harmony.55 In other
words, nalyeeh is based upon the nature of the tort including alleged damages, and
the ability of defendants to pay.
In Navajo Nation v. Crockett, 56 the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
applied nalyeeh in a free speech case.57 Here the high court explained that under
the nalyeeh doctrine, the plaintiff should seek to resolve the matter with the
offending party without seeking intervention from a third person or
entity.58 According to the court, the plaintiff should approach the defendant and
explain why there is a problem, and seek a solution that “puts things right”.59 The
Navajo Nation Supreme Court noted that even in modern times using contemporary
judicial methods, the traditional rules of respect, honesty, and kinship apply.60
Recently, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court applied nalyeeh in a tort case,
overruling a district court decision. The case is significant because it is the only
known case where a tribal court denied full faith and credit to a state entity,
applying traditional law in place of the state statutory scheme. In Nez v. Peabody
Western Coal Company, Inc., 61 the Navajo Nation Supreme Court further
developed and applied the remedy of nalyeeh in a workers’ compensation case. On
June 12, 1995, plaintiff Nez, a member of the Navajo Nation, was injured during
her employment at Peabody’s Black Mesa Mine located near Kayenta, Navajo
Nation (Arizona).62 While cleaning paintbrushes, solvent splattered on plaintiff,
permanently disfiguring her face. She filed a claim for benefits under the Arizona
Workers’ Compensation Act. 63 In April of 1996, the Arizona Industrial
Commission awarded Nez benefits for medical costs, lost wages, and $7,530 for
the disfigurement of her face.64
Nez requested that her case be reopened so she could receive additional
medical treatments for loss of pigmentation.65 Her request was approved and she
was further treated, although the treatment was unsuccessful. 66 Following the
treatment, the Arizona Industrial Commission closed Nez’ case stating that no
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change had occurred since the first benefits award.67 Thus, Nez was left with only
the $7,530 award to compensate her for her permanent facial disfigurement.68
Plaintiff brought a personal injury claim against Peabody in the Kayenta
District Court. Nez sought damages for emotional distress, pain and suffering,
diminution of the quality of her life, permanent facial disfigurement and any other
damages not covered by the workers’ compensation award. Defendant argued that
the Navajo Nation courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction and moved for
dismissal. The district court disagreed although it dismissed the case because the
suit might cause unjust enrichment and violate the expectations of both employers
and employees under a state workers’ compensation system.69
Nez appealed the district court’s decision to the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court arguing that no Navajo principle of equity could deny her suit.70 Defendant
contended that the Navajo Nation must recognize the exclusive remedy provision
of the Arizona workers’ compensation statute.71 Further, Peabody asserted that
even if the Navajo Nation was not required to recognize the statute, Nez should be
denied under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.72
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court articulated the issues in the dispute as:
(1) whether the Arizona Industrial Commission’s award of workers’ compensation
benefits pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 29073 precludes the Navajo courts from assuming
subject matter jurisdiction over a personal injury claim arising from the same
injuries; (2) whether the Kayenta District Court erred in dismissing Nez’ case on
equity grounds. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court held that Arizona’s state
workers’ compensation did not preclude the Navajo Nation from asserting
jurisdiction over Nez’ case. Second, the court held that indeed, the district court
had abused its discretion when it dismissed the case.74
In reaching its decision, the high court first looked to the federal statute to
see whether tribal jurisdiction had been divested. Following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s guidance in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. La Plante, 75 and National
Farmer’s Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe76 the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
reasoned Congress had not expressly divested Navajo jurisdiction.77 Further, the
67
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court reasoned that since the federal statute creating worker’s compensation had
been drafted in 1936, decades prior to the creation of the Navajo Nation Judiciary,
the statute could not have divested the courts of jurisdiction.78 In other words, how
can a federal statute written years prior to the creation of a court and lacking any
implied or express intent divest the same court of jurisdiction?
Additionally, the court reasoned that the exclusivity remedy did not apply.
Relying upon Garcia v. American Airlines, Inc.,79 the high court stated that a forum
state was not required to offer full faith and credit to another state’s exclusive
remedy. 80 Thus, the Navajo Nation courts likewise were not compelled to
recognize Arizona’s exclusive provision. Foreseeing the decision might be opening
a Pandora’s box, the court fashioned a rule. Before the Navajo courts assert
jurisdiction over similar cases, plaintiffs will bear the burden of proving that a
state’s workers’ compensation benefits differ substantially from what Navajo
common law considers adequate.81
The high court also recognized key factual issues to be determined by the
district court in the Nez case. These factors included first, whether Nez’ s award
under the Arizona regime is substantially different and inadequate under Navajo
common law; second, whether Nez waived her rights to pursue a court remedy; and
whether Peabody suffered from Nez’ actions.82
Having dealt with these preliminary issues, the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court turned towards the topic of nalyeeh.
Under Navajo Common law, damages in personal injury actions are
measured by nalyeeh… Nalyeeh has been interpreted to include a broad range of
damages, including claims such as mental anguish and pain and suffering.
However, nalyeeh is a flexible concept of distributive justice, and it is possible that
Navajo common law prevents plaintiffs from seeking to recover twice for the same
injury. How nalyeeh should apply to Nez’s situation is a matter to be determined by
the district court.83
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district
court for a determination of what constitutes nalyeeh.84
sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes,
Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial
decisions.” Id.at 855—56. At a minimum, the tribal exhaustion doctrine requires tribal appellate courts
be provided the opportunity to review the decisions of their lower courts. This rule underlies the federal
government’s current policy of promoting tribal self-government. Id. at 855—57.
78
Nez, 2 Navajo App. Rep. at 553.
79
12 F.3d 308, 312 (1st Cir. 1993).
80
Nez, 2 Navajo App. Rep. at 552—53 (citations omitted). The Navajo Nation Supreme Court explained
that a forum state was not required to recognize the exclusive remedy provision of another state’s
workers’ compensation and further stated that a forum state maintains jurisdiction over an employee’s
common law tort suit even after the employee receives another state’s worker’s
compensation. Id. Generally, states offer full faith and credit or apply comity principles when
recognizing another state’s judgments. The doctrine of full faith and credit springs forth
from AMENDMENT XIV U.S. CONST. Because the Navajo Nation understands its tribal sovereignty
as something at least on par with a state, its legal requirements to recognize another state’s exclusive
remedy would be the same as that of a state-discretionary. See Nez, 2 Navajo App. Rep. at 552—53.
81
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In the meantime, the defendant has appealed to the federal district court in
Arizona and the Navajo Nation Tribal Council has attempted to overrule
the Nez decision by resolution.85 [86] The issue of the validity of the Council’s
resolution and its meaning are currently being deliberated by the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court in the form of a certified question.87 [88] Following Nez, the Navajo
Nation high court revisited the question of nalyeeh and its application to worker’
compensation.
In Benally v. Big A Well Service Co.,89 the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
stated that “[w]e now take this opportunity to explain the principle of nalyeeh. It
does not carry the same meaning as ‘the adequate award’ in contemporary personal
injury practice. Generally, nalyeeh means compensation for an injury.”90 The high
court continued, “[I]t has a deeper meaning of a demand to ‘make right’ for an
injury and an invitation to negotiate what it will take so that an injured party will
have ‘no hard feelings.’”91 However, on the subject of workers’ compensation, the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court cautioned that in most cases, the workers’
compensation award would satisfy the requirements of nalyeeh. 92 Because the
workers’ compensation scheme determines the monetary award through a method
based upon the nature of the injury and the monetary needs of the
worker, nalyeeh is met. 93 The doctrine of nalyeeh is far from being fully
articulated, however its broad application even in workers’ compensation cases
provides the practitioner a well-founded reason to study the case law.
What must be underscored is the doctrine’s remarkable adaptability that in
practical terms can mean damages far different from those awarded in state
court. Nalyeeh can be crudely translated into English as “restitution.” Sadly, the
English meaning offers little by way of justice to the original Navajo because it
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Editor’s Note: The Navajo Nation Supreme Court answered a certified question posed by the United
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Arizona, Peabody Western Coal Company, Inc. v. Nez, Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation 1 (2001).
The certified question before the Navajo Nation Supreme Court was “whether [Navajo Nation Council
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to cases pending prior to its enactment.” Id. at 1—2. The Court focused more precisely on whether the
Navajo Nation Council resolution “[was] a ‘legislative act’ which carrie[d] the weight of law.” Id. at 2.
The Court ultimately held that that “the resolution [was] not a statute which carrie[d] the weight of law,
but a declaration of the wishes of the Navajo Nation Council and guidance for future legislation.” Id.
89
Benally v. Big A Well Service Co., Nav. R., SC-CV-27-99 (Nav. S. Ct. Aug. 28, 2000) cited in
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oversimplifies or even overlooks the restorative value inherent in the Navajo
understanding of restitution.
The Navajo conceptualization of restitution is strikingly different from
conceptualizations
of
restitution
found
in
Anglo-American
jurisprudence.94 Generally in most American jurisdictions, successful plaintiffs are
entitled to recover money damages to compensate them for the injury caused by the
tortfeasor.95 The very foundation of tort law is that someone is hurt or injured by
another, and must prove that his/her injury was the result of someone’s fault.96 The
American law of remedies’ fundamental aspiration is to vindicate the injured
plaintiff’s legal rights in the most economically efficient manner without
overburdening the defendant, keeping within broadly held social policy
concerns.97 In other words, there must be a confrontation between the two parties,
legal fault must be established and legal injury proven, usually resulting in an
economic windfall for the injured party or an equitable remedy. 98 Nalyeeh is
fundamentally different in that the notion of blame and adversarial combat are
foreign. Justice Yazzie explains:
Another aspect of Navajo justice, nalyeeh, which is a payment made to a
victim or someone who is injured, addresses concrete means of resolving conflict.
It transcends the usual definitions of “restitution” and “reparation,” in the sense that
it does not dwell upon what tort lawyers call “just compensation.” In nalyeeh, the
parties discuss what is needed to make the injured person feel better and
compensation can be symbolic… The focus is not on an “eye for an eye, tooth for a
tooth” approach, but on helping people and adjusting their relationships in k’e.99
Navajo philosophy teaches that the world must be kept within balance or
natural harmony. Harmony in the Navajo mind is something more akin to the
Taoism of Asia rather than Hellenistic inspired ideas of anthro-centric humanistic
perfection.
Harmony or hozho refers to the “wholeness of all reality and the
connections of everyone and everything.”100 Navajo Nation Supreme Court Justice
Raymond D. Austin describes hozho as “a reality with a place for everything, and
everything in its place, functioning well with everything else. In other words, the
94

Restitution is a restoration of “something” to the plaintiff and its goal is to prevent the defendant’s
unjust enrichment. Thus, restitution is measured not by the losses to the plaintiff, but by the defendant’s
gains. See _DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 4 (2d ed. 4
1993). Damages on the other hand, are usually lump sums of cash awarded to the winning party who
proves a legally recognizable injury or harm. _See id. at 208. Damages are designed to compensate the
prevailing party for all relevant injuries past and future. See id. Thus, although one might state that a
particular cash judgement or equitable order rendered in a state court might resemble remedies based
upon nalyeeh, the Navajo traditional remedy springs from another source philosophically and factors in
its calculus many mitigating elements not contemplated by American election of remedies.
95
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW:
AN ANALYTICAL PRIMER ON CASES AND CONCEPTS 207 (1997).
96
See id. at 1. The word “tort” comes from the Latin word meaning “twisted.” Hence, when a party
becomes “twisted” by the actions or inactions of another, a tort results. Id.
97
See DOBBS, supra note 93, at 29.
98
See ABRAHAM, supra note 94, at 3.
99
Hozho Nahasdlii, supra note 14, at 123—24. When Justice Yazzie speaks of k’e, the learned jurist
speaks of the way in which things relate to one another in nature. Id. Through k’e, the life force behind
such positive qualities as humanity, solidarity, respect and cooperation come into being. Id. at 122.
100
Id. at 124.
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‘Perfect State’.”101 When an injury occurs, the harmony of both the physical world
and the more esoteric planes are plunged out of balance into a state of chaos. An
offering of restitution is required to restore harmony. In ancient times, an injured
party and his/her family including the “opposing party” met to talk things out.
When an offering was made that was acceptable to all, harmony was restored.102
In the modern tribal courts of the Navajo Nation, the traditional law
of nalyeeh has been applied in many cases that would resemble common law torts
or state tort claims to the non-Indian law practitioner. In this study, we have
examined cases of personal injury, assault, and personal injury associated with a
state workers’ compensation scheme. To be sure, case law provides ample evidence
of the Navajo judiciary’s willingness to further develop the law of nalyeeh,
expanding its application to other tort-like claims.
One question sure to arise is what constitutes sufficient compensation in
order to meet the requirements of nalyeeh. Traditionally, Navajos would offer
livestock, silver, or other valuables to the victim or his/her family. Many times, the
injuring party would offer “a little extra” to demonstrate his/her seriousness.103 In
modern application of nalyeeh, the amount of compensation is unclear. In the most
recent dispositive case, Nez, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court remanded the
matter back to the district court for a determination of damage amounts.104
As discussed earlier, it is important to bear in mind that Indian tribal
courts, the Navajo Nation included, are by no means bound to damages caps
imposed by state tort claims statutes. When applying nalyeeh, juries are free to
award damages as they see fit. When considering damages, juries are thought to
include Navajo values, community standards, and customs in the calculus.105 Thus,
we can say that Navajo tort law is a flexible legal concept with a multitude of
applications and that it has no definite formalization of damages. Although the
flexibility of nalyeeh might sound the alarm to the alert practitioner, bear in mind
Solicitor Zion’s following conclusion. Zion writes, “While non-Indian society may
fear that the use of Indian custom is arbitrary, vague, and discriminatory, the tribal
court that develops a body of law which can be read and which provides a means of
predicting what will happen in court will gain the acceptance of many.”106
In sum, as the Navajo judiciary applies nalyeeh in various circumstances,
a sense of regularity will naturally ensue, and as a result possible skepticism from
outsiders most likely will subside.
C. Considerations for Pleading Nalyeeh
This section discusses how a practitioner pleads a Navajo traditional
doctrine such as nalyeeh in tribal court. When an attorney first takes a case that
he/she believes will result in an appearance before the Navajo courts, the
practitioner would be wise to study the Navajo Rules of Civil Procedure. The first
101

Raymond D. Austin, Freedom, Responsibility and Duty: ADR and the Navajo Peacemaker Court,
32 JUDGE’S J., Spring 1993, at 10.
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Id. at 11.
103
Id.
104
Nez, 2 Navajo App. Rep. at 550.
105
Bryant v. Bryant, 3 Nav. R. 194, 194-95, 3 Navajo L. Rep. 112, 112 (S.R. Dist. Ct. 1981).
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steps, which include drafting the complaint and service of process, are similar to
the rules found in other jurisdictions. However, if one intends to plead a Navajo
custom, one will make such a pleading pursuant to Rule Five.107 The rule provides
that the pleading contain three elements; first a short statement explaining how the
court has jurisdiction over the matter. Second, a statement explaining the claim and
how the party is entitled to relief must be included. It is here that a party would
explain the Navajo custom and how the party is entitled to relief under the custom.
Lastly, the pleading must include a demand for relief or judgment.
Once a custom has been pled, the moving party will have to prove the
existence of the custom. A judge can take judicial notice of a custom. Likewise,
experts, both traditional and academic, and learned treatises can prove custom.108 It
is
important
to
note
that
Navajo
traditional
law
can be pled and applied in state or federal court. When questions concerning the
meaning and application of Navajo traditional law or custom arise in the context of
proceedings in foreign jurisdictions, including administrative agency hearings, the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court can make a determination of the law through a
certified question. The procedure for submitting a certified question of law to the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court is outlined in the court’s rules.109 The foreign court
simply submits the question(s) with the appropriate facts and supporting documents
to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court. Upon receipt, the court will ask for briefs and
other documents, but will seldom allow oral arguments. In some cases, the court
will ask the Navajo Nation Attorney General to submit briefs or comments. Once
the court makes its determination, it will transmit a certified copy of its opinion to
the appropriate foreign court. This procedure for determining traditional law is
especially useful to the practitioner if faced with a case similar to the example
discussed next.
D. Cheromiah v. United States: An Application of Tribal Law in a Federal
Forum and its Significance to Navajo Traditional Tort Law
American courts follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead when Indian
plaintiffs seek to file suits in state or federal courts and attempt to apply tribal law
in the case. The Supreme Court in various decisions has defended tribal
sovereignty by finding tribal interests in various cases. When the courts determine
that tribal interests are great enough to apply tribal law, they more than frequently
remand the cases back to the tribal courts following exhaustion
doctrines.110 Ironically, in State v. A-1 Contractors,111 the Supreme Court couldn’t
107

See In the Matter of Estate of Belone, 5 Nav. R. 161, 5 Navajo L. Rep. 82 (Nav. S. Ct. 1987). The
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find a substantial tribal interest in a case involving an automobile accident within
the reservation.112 Nevertheless, there are occasions when plaintiffs filing in state or
federal court will seek to apply tribal law. Although to some practitioners the
possibility seems remote and the stuff of law school exam questions, a recent
federal case provides the perfect example.113
In the recent case, Cheromiah v. United States,114 an Indian family sought
to file an action for wrongful death as provided for in the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA). 115 The plaintiffs brought suit against the United States Government,
seeking damages for the death of their adult son.116 Plaintiffs asserted a claim for
medical malpractice under the Federal Tort Claims Act, two claims under the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act and finally a claim for loss of
consortium.117 Cheromiah had been to the Indian Health Services operated hospital,
the Acoma Canoncito Laguna Hospital 118 several times complaining of a
respiratory problem. The doctors misdiagnosed his condition, and as a result, Mr.
Cheromiah died while being transported to another hospital in Albuquerque.119
Among many things, the federal district court held that the tort had
occurred within the boundaries of the Acoma Indian Reservation.120 Relying upon
federal case law, the court explained that federal law provides that the law of the
place of injury controls, further, the analysis was applicable to political
entities.121 Thus, the court held the Acoma tribal law and not New Mexico tort law
applicable in this case.122
Once the court decided that issue, the second issue was whether a private
person in like circumstances could be found liable under Acoma tribal law for the
acts of negligence asserted in the complaint. In other words, could the United
States government be sued like a private person? The district court answered in the
affirmative. In reaching its decision, the court looked to two major cases, Montana
v. United States;123 and A-1 Contractors. The court reasoned that in this case, the
two Montana exceptions were met, consensual relations and a threat to tribal health
and welfare. Secondly, the court distinguished this case from Strate because this
case involved Indian plaintiffs and the tort related to Indian health and welfare.
Once the court applied Acoma tribal law, it found the New Mexico’s damage caps
112

Id. This case involved two non-tribal member parties who hit one another on a highway within an
Indian reservation. Id. at 442. Because both parties were non tribal members and the accident occurred
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considered minimal. Id. at 457.
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inapplicable. Thus, tribal tort law was applied. In the words of Professor Kathrine
C. Pearson, “[t]he Cheromiah decision signals the Federal Tort Claims Act as a
future area for recognition of tribal law as a viable choice in conflicts of law.”124
The Cheromiah decision is important because it demonstrates a way in
which traditional ideas of tort through the Navajo law of nalyeeh can be applied in
a federal forum. What is important to note is the Cheromiah plaintiff’s creative
application of the Federal Tort Claims Act’s provisions for choice of law. Until
Congress amends the statute, more litigants could employ similar creativity,
tactically sidestepping federal or state law in favor of tribal law. The door was
opened via the FTCA, perhaps in the future, other federal statutory schemes could
be used a vehicle for applying traditional tribal law.
The case genuinely offers an example of the federal judiciary’ willingness
to apply traditional Indian law when possible. Certainly, not all courts within the
federal system will be as open to the possibility of applying tribal law as
the Cheromiah. However, the case offers persuasive support and federal precedent
for the proposition that traditional law such as nalyeeh is a viable alternative to
state law and state law remedies.
II. Conclusion
This paper has argued the proposition that Indian tribal law is law in the
United States and can be applied in tribal, state, and federal forums. Tribal
customary law finds its origin in the chants, dances, songs, and stories, which
embody the oral tradition of indigenous people. Because tribal governments are
products of the inherent sovereign rights of Native people, and not a result of
federal statute, tribal governments are free to apply traditional law when it does not
conflict with federal law. Moreover, thanks in a large part to U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, tribal jurisdiction and tribal law have been held to be applicable in cases
involving non-Indians. Thus, for these reasons, one concludes that indeed, tribal
custom is law in America.
Tribal customs relating to personal injury have been applied in a variety of
settings. This paper discussed the Navajo concept of nalyeeh, which loosely
translates as something akin to “restitution”. In sum, Navajo tort law is nalyeeh and
its sole purpose, unlike Anglo-American tort law, is to restore harmony to the
community. Nalyeeh does not seek to point the finger of blame and fault, nor is it a
means of winning a monetary windfall from a contest-like proceeding.
Rather, nalyeeh seeks to encourage parties to talk things out, resolve differences,
and restore balance to society. One can say that nalyeeh is healing or restorative
justice. Thus, one concludes that Navajo tort law is in reality, community-based
curative problem solving.
In the Navajo Nation, parties seeking to introduce traditional law such
as nalyeeh must meet the pleading requirements set forth in the both the Navajo
Nation Rules of Civil Procedure and case law. Parties must plead Navajo tradition
in their pleadings or be barred from introducing it later in the case. Navajo tradition
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can be proven by expert testimony, reliance upon both Navajo and learned
academic treatises, and finally, by judicial notice.
For the practitioner, understanding tribal law is important. The possibility
of arguing traditional tribal law in federal court and prevailing is very possible.
The Cheromiah case provides ample support for the contention that traditional
tribal law can provide an apropos tort system fitting the needs of Native people.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, traditional ideas such nalyeeh offer the
mainstream culture the possibility of evolving beyond the confines of fault-based
common law torts.

